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Abstract
Reputation systems have been proposed to distinguish malicious peers and ensure the quality of services in P2P networks. How-
ever, only relying on global reputation scores to assess the reliability of ﬁle providers can weaken the subjective opinions of ﬁle
requesters, which is vulnerable to some malicious attacks, e.g., camouﬂage attack. To address this issue, in this paper, we propose a
novel hybrid trust model, namely HTM, based on the EigenTrust reputation management system. In HTM, a ﬁle requester utilizes
a two-phase reference method to take both the global reputation and the direct trust of a ﬁle provider into consideration when
deciding whether to download from it or not. In particular, in the ﬁrst phase, a requester selects a provider from the responders
based on the roulette wheel selection algorithm; while in the second phase, the requester considers the direct trust on the selected
provider with our proposed direct trust evaluation approach. The extended simulation results show that our mechanism can identify
and isolate the malicious peers both under individual attack and camouﬂage attack eﬀectively, thus improving the performance of
P2P ﬁle sharing networks.
c© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
Peer-review under responsibility of the Conference Program Chairs.
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1. Introduction
To resist malicious attacks and ensure the reliable service delivery in P2P networks, reputation systems are in-
dispensable. EigenTrust1, PeerTrust2, GenTrust3, and SecuredTrust4 are some of reputation systems that provide
defence against malicious attacks. A reputation system calculates the reputation score of a peer by aggregating the
ratings from all the valuators who have interacted with this peer5. By referring to the global reputation scores, a peer
can make preferable decisions when requesting services. EigenTrust1 is one of the most popular reputation systems
that is used practically in Gnutella. By providing the global reputation scores to ﬁle requesters when they select ﬁle
owners, EigenTrust can identify and isolate malicious peers eﬀectively.
However, in real-world scenarios, direct experience is also very important in judging the characteristics of others:
people tend to ask for the recommended trust of another one when they are not familiar with each other, but they may
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trust their own judgements more than the recommended information after they know each other6. In fact, EigenTrust
has a poor performance in the case of malicious peers camouﬂaging themselves as being trustworthy by uploading
40% authentic ﬁles, which can result in the inauthentic downloading rate increases to 28% in the network1. In such
situations, inauthentic ﬁles can be downloaded easily, which reﬂects the fact that the reputation scores of peers are
not accurate enough7. Although a peer can continue to download from other peers until it obtains the desired ﬁle,
such multiple downloads can result in transmitting large amounts of junk or malicious data. It wastes bandwidth and
decreases the eﬃciency of the application system.
Based on EigenTrust, we propose a two-phase hybrid trust model for P2P ﬁle sharing networks in this paper. The
aim of our work is to provide a better mechanism to validate the trustworthiness of a peer so that the judgement upon
ﬁle owners is more precise, thus reducing the impact of malicious attacks. The basic idea is that the requester in an
interaction should consider both the global reputation and the direct trust of the ﬁle owner. Simulation results show
that our proposed model is eﬀective in isolating malicious peers under individual attacks and camouﬂage attacks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 illustrates the proposed hybrid trust model. Section 3
demonstrates our simulations and analysis. Finally, we conclude our paper in section 4.
2. Hybrid Trust System
In this section, we ﬁrst propose a direct trust evaluation method, and then give an indirect trust evaluation based
the iterative approach in EigenTrust1.
2.1. Direct Trust Evaluation
Beth8 proposed a simple method to calculate direct trust value, which is shown in Eq. (1):
dt = 1 − αp (1)
where p represents the positive number of evaluations that peer i to peer j and α is a system parameter between 0
and 1.
It is apparent that the trust value in Eq. (1) is not less than (1 − α), i.e., the trust is dependent on the value of α.
Here, we give a variation of Eq. (1) and propose our direct trust assessing method in Eq. (2):
dti j =
{
(1 − 0.5d) · sati j/s , i f d ≥ 0;
0 , otherwise.
(2)
where d = sati j − unsati j, and s = sati j + unsati j. And sati j, unsati j represent the satisfactory and unsatisfactory
transaction times between peer i and peer j, respectively.
From Eq. (2), we can know that dti j increases from 0 to 0.5 right oﬀ when a peer download a satisﬁed ﬁle from
another peer for the ﬁrst time. However, as the times of satisfactory transactions increase, the growth rate of direct
trust value slows down. In Eq. (2), sati j/s is a simple regulatory factor which distinguishes diﬀerent interaction
histories. For example, assume 6 interactions in total, 4 are satisfactory, and 2 are unsatisfactory. Then, the result is
1/2 if the factor is considered, but it is 3/4 without the regulatory factor.
2.2. Indirect Trust Evaluation
The normalized direct trust of peer i to peer j (noted as ci j) is denoted in Eq. (3):
ci j =
max(dti j, 0)∑
j max(dti j, 0)
(3)
When
∑
j max(dti j, 0) = 0, then ci j = pi, and pi = 1/|P| if i∈P (P is the pre-trusted peers set), otherwise pi = 0.
Peer i may ask its friends’ opinions about the target peer k. Deﬁne the indirect trust of peer i to peer k as tik, then
the indirect trust calculation in EigenTrust is shown in Eq. (4):
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tik =
∑
j
ci jc jk (4)
Let C be the matrix [ci j], and t be the vector that contains tik; then t = CTci. Peer i also can ask the friends of its
friends (t = (CT )2ci). After continuous iterations (t = (CT )
n
ci), i will be able to know the trust distribution of the entire
network. If n is large enough, the trust vector ti will converge to the same vector t for all peers. In other words, t can
be regarded as the vector of reputation scores of all the peers. Further, EigenTrust uses Eq. (5) to restrain malicious
attacks:
t(k+1) = (1 − a)CTtk + ap (5)
where a is a constant that is between 0 and 1 and p is the vector that contains pi.
2.3. Phase One
In the ﬁrst phase, the reputation scores help peers to single out a potentially reliable ﬁle provider. That is to say,
after sending a ﬁle query, the requester chooses a server from the ﬁle query responders based on their reputation
scores.
Now, we explain how to select the a provider. An alternative way is always selecting the peer with the highest
reputation score from the response list. The global reputation score of a speciﬁed peer is same for every other peer,
so the most reputable peer who is online currently will be always selected. Hence, the upload pressure of this peer
would be high. To solve this problem, we use the roulette wheel selection (RWS) algorithm9 here. The idea is that
the probability of a server being selected should be proportional to its reputation score. Assume there are N peers in
the network, each characterized by its reputation ri ≥ 0 (i = 1, 2, . . . ,N). The selection probability of the ith peer is:
spi =
ri∑N
j=1 r j
, ( j = 1, 2, . . . ,N). (6)
However, the RWS algorithm is not fair to good peers who have a reputation score of 0 (e.g., the new comers)
because that they have no chances to be selected as servers to upload ﬁles. To address this issue, a ﬁle requester can
select from non-reputable providers with a probability of 10% and select a provider whose reputation is greater than
0 using RWS with a probability of 90%.
2.4. Phase Two
In the second phase, a ﬁle requester makes a decision of whether to download from the potential provider that
selected in phase one or not. And this process is based on the direct trust level of the requester on the provider. First,
assume that every peer has a direct trust threshold in another peer. In realistic scenarios, the thresholds of diﬀerent
peers may be distinct. For the sake of simplicity, we further assume that the thresholds of all the peers are same in
this paper. Then the second phase of HTM can be described as follows: The requester, R, considers whether it has
had previous interactions with the selected peer, S . If they had no interaction history, then R chooses to download the
ﬁle from the S directly. Otherwise, R will reference to the direct trust on S . If the direct trust value is higher than R′s
threshold, then it chooses to establish a connection and begin to download the ﬁle from S , otherwise it will delete S
from the response list and reselect another ﬁle provider as phase one shows. The requester repeats the above process
until it has selected a satisfactory provider or there are no providers available any more.
3. Experiments and analysis
This section presents the simulation and analysis. Here, we consider two attack models: individual attack and
camouﬂage attack. Malicious peers in individual attack are isolated malicious peers, which means that the malicious
peers do not know each other, and they attack the system by always uploading inauthentic ﬁle and giving negative
evaluations to good downloads. Malicious peers in camouﬂage attack are aware of each other and always give pos-
itive evaluations each other. Moreover, they camouﬂage themselves by uploading some good ﬁles to enhance their
credibility, thus being selected as a server and uploading inauthentic ﬁles more often.
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Fig. 1. Fraction of inauthentic ﬁles uploaded. Fig. 2. Number of inauthentic ﬁles uploaded. Fig. 3. Fraction of inauthentic ﬁles downloaded.
We conduct several simulation experiments and analyse the two attack models qualitatively. We use C language
version of the QTM: P2P Trust Simulator framework10 developed by University of Pennsylvania to deploy our exper-
iments.
3.1. Set up
We simulate a small-scale P2P network containing less than 100 peers. In particular, the number of peers in the
two attack models are 63 and 73, respectively, which is the same as EigenTrust. The initial details of the experimental
conﬁguration are listed in Table 1, and GP, MP and PTP stand for good peers, malicious peers and pre-trusted peers,
respectively.
Table 1. Parameter Conﬁguration in Simulations.
Notation Deﬁnition
Parameter Value
No. of PTP 3
No. of GP 60
No. of neighbors of MP 10
No. of neighbors of PTP 10
File number 20
Files at GP 3
File at MP 20
Top % of queries GP and PTP response to 5%
Top % of queries MP response to 20%
File provider selection algorithm RWS
Probability of peer i with ri = 0 being selected 10%
Probability of MP upload good ﬁles 0%
Direct trust threshold of every peer 0.5
3.2. Individual attack
In individual attack, good peers upload reliable ﬁles and give subjective feedbacks. And individual malicious peers
always upload inauthentic ﬁles and give inauthentic feedback. We conduct eight group of experiments. In each group,
there are diﬀerent percentages of malicious peers and good peers. The percentage of malicious peers ranges from 0 to
70%, increasing by 10% each time from the ﬁrst group to the eighth group.
Fig. 1 compares the percentage of inauthentic ﬁles uploads and total uploads under the pure EigenTrust reputation
mechanism (PRM) and our hybrid trust mechanism (HTM). The statistical indicator is the percentage of uploaded
inauthentic ﬁles in the network. The ordinate axis shows the malicious proportion in the network and the horizontal
axis is the diﬀerent percentages of malicious peers. The results are averaged over 10 runs.
Fig. 2 is similar to Fig. 1, but the statistical indicator is the number of inauthentic ﬁles that are uploaded under
diﬀerent proportion of malicious peers participating in the network.
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Fig. 4. Uploads distribution, f = 0.0. Fig. 5. Uploads distribution, f = 0.4. Fig. 6. Uploads distribution, f = 0.9.
Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 show that HTM performanced better than PRM. This beneﬁts from the advantages of HTM, i.e.,
when selecting a server, the requester considers not only the reputation score but also the direct trust of the ﬁle owner.
For the target peer that had an interaction history with the requester, a reference to direct trust determines the identity
of the destination peer more accurately, which can reduce the probability of downloading ﬁles from a malicious peer.
Therefore, HTM’s accuracy in predicting the credibility of a particular download source is better than that of PRM.
3.3. Camouﬂage attack
In camouﬂage attack, the behaviours of good peers are similar to those in individual attack: they oﬀer good ﬁles
and give subjective feedback. However, malicious peers know each other and give positive feedbacks among them
no matter whether the downloaded ﬁles are good or inauthentic. And malicious peers try to camouﬂage themselves
by uploading a good ﬁle with a probability of f . In this scenario, there are 73 peers in the network, including 53
good peers, 3 pre-trusted peers and 20 malicious peers. We choose the situation of non-trust mechanism (NTM) as
the baseline. The statistical indicator is the download percentages of inauthentic ﬁles. Fig. 3 shows the results.
As shown in Fig. 3, in NTM, the percentage of inauthentic ﬁles downloaded decreased gradually as the malicious
peer uploaded more good ﬁles. It is obvious that since the more malicious peers upload good ﬁles, the less inauthentic
good peers download inauthentic ﬁles. In cases that involve trust mechanism, the reputation scores of malicious peers
increase as they provide more good ﬁles, thus resulting in malicious peers with a higher probability of being selected.
This in turn provides them with more opportunities to upload inauthentic ﬁles. But uploading too many good ﬁles
involves much cost for malicious peers, which is unfavourable from the perspective of the attackers. When they
provide more good ﬁles, the majority of total ﬁles in the network are good. Therefore, the inauthentic downloads will
decrease. Both of HTM and PRM accord with the above analysis, while our THM performs signiﬁcantly better than
PRM when the percentage of good ﬁles malicious peers provide is smaller than 0.6. This is mainly due to the fact that
HTM improves the accuracy of the judgement with respect to the direct trust over ﬁle providers. Requesters are more
likely to download from good peers who have relatively high direct trust relationships with them.
Next, we focus on three speciﬁc cases in which the probability of uploading good ﬁles by malicious peers are 0,
0.4, and 0.9. We give three group of results showing the distribution of uploads at every peer in HTM and PRM,
respectively (numbers 1-20 stand for malicious peers, numbers 21-23 for pre-trusted peers, and the rest are the good
peers).
From Fig. 4, we can see that the overall uploads of malicious peers are less than that of PRM. According to the
second phase of our HTM, even if a malicious peer respond to a request, the requester will not easily select it to
download a ﬁle. In contrast, there is a great probability that the requester continues to choose from other response
peers, which can reduce the probability of downloading ﬁles from malicious peers. In this way, the proposed HTM
reduces the pollution of network traﬃc by reducing the transmit of inauthentic ﬁles. In other words, our mechanism
identiﬁes malicious peers more eﬀectively in this case.
The results in Fig. 5 show that the average number of uploads by malicious peers in PRM and HTM are around
520 and 200, respectively, which means HTM can eﬀectively reduce camouﬂage attack. As for the reason, we give
the qualitative analysis here. Since malicious peers upload many good ﬁles to the network, the reputation scores of
them are greater than 0. Therefore, they are selected as servers easily in PRM, but the requesters do not know they are
malicious peers. Once they are selected, they will upload a inauthentic ﬁle with a high probability, which is harmful
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to the network. While in our HTM, a selected peer may be discarded due to the poor direct trust on it. This case also
shows HTM can isolate the malicious peers better than PRM.
Fig. 6 shows the upload numbers caused by malicious peers both in PRM and HTM are very high and have almost
the same total upload amount. This is mainly because of the fairly high probability of the malicious peer providing
good ﬁles. In this case, the two-phase reference in our HTM does not have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence. However, in this
case, since the malicious peers always upload a lot of good ﬁles, we have reasons to regard them as good peers and
there is no need to isolate them again.
4. Conclusion
In this paper we propose a hybrid trust mechanism (HTM) for P2P ﬁle sharing networks. HTM is a two-phase
method to consider both of the direct trust and the global reputation of a peer. After selecting a potential ﬁle provider
according to the roulette wheel selection algorithm, the ﬁle requester further considers the direct trust of the opponent,
which can eﬀectively restrain two malicious attacks in the system. Because of the increased precision of evaluating
peers, HTM can increase the reliability and eﬃciency of P2P applications to a certain degree. The simulation results
and our analysis show that the proposed HTM can reduce the downloading rate of inauthentic ﬁles eﬀectively, thereby
reducing the propagation of inauthentic ﬁles, and increasing the availability of the system.
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